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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-SOME OBSERVATIONS 
ABOUT ALLOCATION OF. RISKS 
Page Keeton* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE scientific and technological revolution through which our society is proceeding is accompanied by vast changes in existing 
products as well as a proliferation of new products, notably with 
respect to drugs, cosmetics, and other chemical products. For exam-
ple, it has been noted that three fourths of the prescriptions written 
by doctors in the United States today are for drugs and vaccines 
which were unknown in 1950.1 
Barely a generation ago, a doctor's little black bag contained 
only a small number of effective drugs. In it were a few pain 
remedies, anesthetics, and antitoxins. His bag might also have 
contained mercury, quinine, digitalis, iodine, and opium in 
one form or another. All of these medications have been known 
for hundreds of years. They were the same ones, with few ex-
ceptions, that might have been used in treating an ailing 
Shakespeare .... But after the discovery of the first sulfa drug 
in the Thirties, a doctor's medical kit became a treasury of 
new drugs that helped to heal, to cure and to save lives. With 
this discovery, the world entered the age of chemotherapy-
the treatment of disease with chemical agents.2 
It might also be said that it is an age of chemocosmetology-the 
improvement of the appearance through treatment of the skin and 
hair. Many of the new products and so-called improvements in exist-
ing products are beneficial when viewed from the standpoint of the 
general good. Often, however, the benefits to the many come at a 
high cost to the few, for there are increasingly more opportunities 
for mishaps, not only in the manufacturing process, but also in the 
marketing and use of the finished products. 
Today a great many more persons tha.n. ever before are being 
victimized by the dangers inherent in the use of consumer durable 
goods as well as products intended for intimate bodily use-foods, 
drugs, and cosmetics. This substantial increase in the incidence of 
unintended harm occurring in the course of, or as a consequence of, 
the use of products, together with the enhanced social concern for 
the victims of our modern devices, is bringing about a reexamina-
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Texas.-Ed. 
I. National Observer, May 3, 1965. 
2. Address by Edward D. Downing, Peculiar Problems in Pharmaceutical Cases, at 
Legal Institute, University of Arkansas, Oct. 1965. · 
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tion of the principles formerly utilized by the courts for shifting 
losses. A prerequisite to the shifting of losses on a tort theory has 
commonly been a finding of fault on the part of the manufacturer 
or other seller. Until recently, moreover, contractual obligations, 
the bases of which are to be found in the commercial codes of the 
various states, have been limited largely to the parties to the sales 
or sales contracts and have been regarded as obligations that the 
parties could alter by clearly stating in their written agreements 
their intention to do so. As the scope of liability increases, orthodox 
contractual principles of freedom of contract are being qualified, 
and fault as a prerequisite for shifting losses on a tort theory is be-
ing abandoned. As might be expected, when substantial changes are 
made in the law, and especially when the change is effected by the 
judiciary by means of a case-by-case- development rather than by the 
legislature, there is much uncertainty as to the ultimate extent of 
the change. The uncertainty is enhanced with regard to the liability 
of makers and sellers of products because the recent expansion of 
the scope of their liability has been the result of the application of 
two competing, but not necessarily inconsistent, theories-warranty 
and strict tort.3 
Virtually all of the activities of mankind involve the use of some 
product. Consequently, nearly all losses in the nature of physical 
damage to persons or things, and a great deal of the economic losses 
flowing from inferior or unfit products, are factually caused by char-
acteristics or conditions of products, or at least occur during the 
use of products. Therefore, when fault, in the sense in which fault 
has been used in the Anglo-American law of torts (a usage which fre-
quently results in the imposition of liability without personal fault), 
is abandoned as a basis for shifting or allocating losses, some rules 
and principles must be substituted in its place in order to delimit 
liability; othenvise, the result would be a revolutionary scheme, in-
volving the imposition of all losses on the makers of products as a 
class rather than upon the ultimate purchasers as a class. It has been 
suggested that something similar to this may indeed occur.4 Even 
now, if it must be shown that the harm resulted from a defective 
condition of a product, some courts have assumed the existence of 
3. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965) (war• 
ranty theory); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. App. 2d 67, 377 P,2d 897 
(1963) (strict tort theory); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A,2d 
69 (1960) (warranty theory); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 
191 N.E.2d 816 (1963) (strict tort theory); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products 
Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential 
Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1965), 
4. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1965). 
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a defective condition from (1) the unexplained occurrence of an 
accident in the course of an allegedly careful use of the product, 
and (2) the often unreliable testimony of an injured user that he 
was careful in the handling and use of the product. This practice 
lends support to the proposition that, realistically, the maker of the 
product is a risk distributor for all losses other than those attrib-
utable to certain known causes. 5 This problem will be discussed in 
more detail below, since the attitude of the courts concerning ques-
tions of proof and sufficiency of evidence is as important as are the 
substantive rules for defining the "risks" to be borne.6 
I!. THE .ARGUMENTS FOR STRICT LIABILITY 
Avoidance of circuity of action has often been asserted as a jus-
tification for warranty liability without privity of contract. The war-
ranties of merchantability and of general fitness for the purposes 
for which the product was made have long been imposed under 
sales law on the maker and other sellers in favor of an immediate 
purchaser in order to compensate him for economic harm.7 Such a 
warranty, however, has not been universally imposed on the retail 
seller for the benefit of the ultimate consumer or user when the 
specific object was available for inspection and when the sale was 
not regarded as a sale by description.8 Moreover, liability for physi-
cal harm under such a contractual or warranty obligation did not 
necessarily follow from the fact that the product was unsuitable for 
the purposes for which it was made. Thus, the abandonment of the 
privity requirement as a basis for recovery, whether done on strict 
tort theories or on warranty theories, constitutes a greater change 
than can be justified merely by the advantages derived from the 
avoidance of circuity of action. The issue, in fact, is not the avoid-
ance of circuity of action, but rather the decision when and to whom 
a loss should be shifted. 
The abandonment of privity as a requirement for recovery on 
warranty theories has also been supported by the argument that, as 
a practical matter, the ultimate purchaser or user is dealing with the 
maker who markets under a trade name and advertises nationally, 
and that resellers of all kinds are simply conduits, albeit separate 
5. Evangelino v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 339 Mass. 177, 158 N.E.2d 342 (1959) 
(bottle explosion incident to allegedly careful use); Bronson v. Hudson Co., 135 N.W .2d 
388 (Mich. 1965) (dermatitis followed wearing of cotton slip). 
6. See part IV infra. · 
7. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-314. 
8. See HONNOLD, SALES AND SALES FINANCING 60-63 (1954); Ruud, The Vendor's 
Responsibility for Quality in the Automated Retail Sale, 9 KAN. L. REv. 139 (1960). 
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legal entities, for distribution to the users.9 Therefore, the obliga-
tions, whatever they might be, should run directly from the manu-
facturer to the purchaser-consumer, despite the indirect marketing 
process. Consistent with this approach, the warranty provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code have generally been interpreted to 
allow recovery in the absence of privity of contract.10 But this analy-
sis does not answer the questions relating to the liability of those 
entrepreneurs, other than the maker, who are involved in the mar-
keting and distribution process, and it does not define the extent 
of the warranty or the legal obligations of the manufacturer. 
The warranty of merchantability, and thus liability without 
fault, has often been explained on the theory of a tacit represen-
tation by silence; the maker tacitly represents that his product is 
fit for its general purposes, and the purchaser assumes that the prod-
uct is what it purports to be.11 Proof of the purchaser's reliance on 
such a representation is, of course, not necessary. The maker repre-
sents only that he has utilized reasonable manufacturing practices 
and has exercised reasonable skill and care in supplying his product 
to the public. No one assumes perfection in any maker's process. 
Indeed, it is well known that a few products coming off an assembly 
line will not be safe or fit for their intended uses, even when the 
utmost care is ·exercised. A product which is unfit for the purpose 
intended, however, frustrates consumer expectations, and a product 
that is dangerous for use as intended frustrates expectations regard-
ing its safety. It may be argued that harm resulting from the frus-
tration of consumer expectations as to a product's qualities or safety 
for use should be shifted to the maker as a cost of doing business. 
This use of the criterion of frustration as a justification for the im-
position of liability has a tremendous impact on the extent and 
nature of strict liability. For example, the user of cigarettes is no 
longer unaware of the dangers of smoking; he elects to take a chance 
in order to enjoy the benefits of smoking. If frustration of consumer 
expectations as to the nature and quality of the product were the 
only basis for shifting losses without fault, recovery would be lim-
ited to only those consumers who had no kno,vledge of the risk. 
Stated generally, the rule would be that a consumer assumed any 
9. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965) (defective gun 
-bystander allowed recovery); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 
A.2d 696 (1960). 
IO. See generally Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection: Re• 
cent Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1430, 1442•52 
(1966). 
11. See generally James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 192 (1955); Prosser, 
The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943). 
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risk of which he was aware before his injury. This conclusion was 
clearly stated in one of the recent cases involving lung cancer caused 
by cigarette smoking.12 
The reduction of the incidence of harm resulting from unfit and 
unsafe products is often stated to be one of the reasons for the impo-
sition of liability without fault on the maker and other sellers.13 
However, there are several problems with this argument. First, this 
rationale would frequently not justify imposing liability on resellers, 
since they may have no opportunity to discover the conditions that 
might produce the harmful results. The reseller's liability can gen-
erally be supported only by the theory that he is a convenient con-
duit for transmitting a loss to the maker, but the conduit argument 
is often a very doubtful justification. Second, the desire to reduce 
accidents justifies shifting losses to a manufacturer only if he could 
have eliminated a condition of the product that ought not to have 
existed. Consequently, liability should not be extended to makers 
for harm resulting from unavoidable injurious effects of highly 
desirable products, such as good penicillin, good cigarettes, or good 
whiskey. In addition, it is doubtful whether strict liability induces 
greater care than does negligence liability.14 Moreover, if strict lia-
bility does induce greater care, it can be argued that it will also tend 
to inhibit the development of new products.' Thus, the importance 
of the development of new products may be a factor to be considered 
in establishing the limits of strict liability. 
The principal reason now widely accepted for shifting losses 
from consumers to manufacturers is that those engaged in the manu-
facturing enterprise have the capacity to distribute the losses of the 
few among the many who purchase the products. The assumption is 
that the manufacturer can shift the loss to the consumers by charging 
higher prices for the products.15 In fixing limits to the legal liability 
of makers based on this view, in conjunction with the discussion 
above, it would obviously seem desirable for the courts and legis-
latures to consider other existing ways for shifting or guarding 
12. Pritchard v. Liggett&: Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965); Cintrone 
v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (lessor absolved from liability 
because of user's contributory negligence in using truck with knowledge of defect), 
13. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); 
Jacob E. Decker &: Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). But see the dis-
senting opinion by Judge Burke in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 
432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963). 
14. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960). 
15. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. App. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); 
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 201 N.E.2d 313 (Ill. App. 1965); Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 696 (1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument 
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963). 
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against losses. For example, the availability of, as well as the prac-
tices of acquiring, _insurance is quite important. Since nearly every 
head of a family, with the exception of the indigent, protects him-
self and his dependents by means of life insurance, it may be unde-
sirable to shift losses from wrongful deaths to makers without regard 
to this widespread use of life insurance.16 Also significant is the fact 
that employees of industrial and commercial users of products are 
already covered by workmen's compensation, and thus a satisfactory 
compensation scheme might be an answer to the problem of distrib-
uting losses attributable to physical harms suffered in the course of 
their employment. Such a, plan would eliminate the costly and time-
consuming task of identifying the cause of an accident, such as an 
explosion that occurs during the use by one enterpriser of an oxygen 
cylinder supplied by a second enterpriser and an acetylene torch 
furnished by a third.17 In these situations, the users of the products 
are fully capable of assuming and distributing losses. 
III. THE R.IsKs To BE ALLOCATED 
Harm, whether it takes the form of an economic loss or a physi-
cal injury to persons or property, can occur for a variety of reasons 
because of, during, or following the use of a product.18 First, the 
harm may have resulted, despite careful and proper use, from an un-
intended condition of the product that made it different from prod-
ucts of like kind made by the same manufacturer. Such an occur-
rence is frequently referred to as a miscarriage in the manufacturing 
process. Most of the leading cases applying principles of warranty or 
strict liability since the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc.,19 have involved harm resulting from such unintended 
16. There is a conflict as to whether wrongful death statutes in the various states 
can be interpreted so as to permit. recovery without fault. The language of most of 
the statutes provides for recovery when an injury causing the death of a person is 
caused by a wrongful act or neglect. Some courts have held that the wrongful death 
statute creates a cause of action only when the defendant's conduct constitutes a tort 
arising out of negligence. See Whiteley v. Webb's City, Inc., 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951); 
Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935); Di Belardino v. Lemmon 
Pharmacal Co., 208 A.2d 283 (Pa. 1965). Others have permitted a recovery: Dagley v. 
Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument 
Corp., supra note 15. 
17. An employee-user recovered on strict liability theories against the supplier of 
an oxygen cylinder in Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W .2d 885 (Ark. 1964). Employ-
ees of an industrial user also recovered in Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 401 P.2d 844 
(Wash. 1965), involving a premature explosion of dynamite. On the other hand, re-
covery was denied in Barlow Protective Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeVilbriss Co., 214 F. Supp. 
540 (E.D. Wis. 1963). 
18. A list of some of these reasons has been set forth heretofore by the author. 
Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. 
L.F. 693, 695. 
19. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 696 (1960). 
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conditions. Examples of these conditions are the defective steering 
wheel of the automobile in Henningsen, the defective altimeter of 
the airplane in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,20 the inade-
quate set screws in the power tool in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc.,21 the defective fork stem in Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. 
Co.,22 and live virus in polio vaccine.23 If liability without fault and 
without privity of contract is ever to ·be imposed on makers, it should 
be applied to compensate for injuries resulting from these or similar 
unintended conditions. Indeed, courts have quite generally recog-
nized a miscarriage in the manufacturing process as a proper risk 
to be allocated to the manufacturer. 
According to the Second Restatement of Torts,24 an unintended 
and defective condition that arises during manufacture subjects the 
maker to strict liability on a tort theory if the defective condition 
is one that makes the product "unreasonably dangerous."25 Some 
courts, by their use of language such· as "imminently dangerous," 
imply that the· test is whether the unintended condition made the 
product so dangerous that a reasonable man, with knowledge of the 
condition, would not have sold it as it existed. Thus the issue be-
comes whether the maker would have been negligent in selling such 
a product with knowledge of its condition. Assuming that the same 
defenses are available to a maker under the strict tort theory as are 
available to him when liability is imposed on a negligence theory, 
the only significant difference between the two approaches is that 
with a strict liability theory the injured party is relieved of the ne-
cessity of proving either that the defective condition was negligently 
created or that the maker or other seller knew of the condition or 
20. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963). 
21. 59 Cal. App. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). 
22. 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964). 
23. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1960). 
24. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965): 
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
, change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although , 
· (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
25. Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of 
a Defect, 41 TEXAS L REv. 855, 859 (1963); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufac-
turers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965). See also Keeton, supra note 18, at 702, where it is sug-
gested that "unreasonably dangerous" means that the. product must have been "so 
dangerous to the user in the condition that it was in that a reasonable man would 
not have sold it in such condition with knowledge of such a condition and apprecia-
tion of the danger." · 
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should have discovered it in the exercise of ordinary care. Since one 
or both of these elements of a negligence action have frequently 
been inferred merely from proof of a defective condition, no revo-
lutionary change has been effected by the imposition of strict tort 
liability for miscarriages in the manufacturing process. 
A second type of risk is that a product may be wholly unsuitable 
for its purpose and yet not be unsafe to the user. When the issue 
concerns the liability of a maker or other seller for physical harm, 
the question for the jury is not whether the product was unmer-
chantable in the sense of having been unfit for its purpose, but 
rather whether the product was unreasonably dangerous to the con-
sumer. It is submitted that courts should not confuse the jury by 
using language of "unfitness" when what is meant is "danger." A 
dangerous condition may very well be regarded as making a product 
unfit, but it is the magnitude of the danger that is the decisive issue. 
Minor defects should not result in liability. 
Another distinct type of risk is exemplified by losses resulting 
from a condition of a product that was characteristic of all the mak-
er's products of that same kind. That is, the product was exactly as 
it was intended to be and was properly used for the purposes for 
which it was designed, but harm nevertheless resulted. In some cases 
there may be a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous 
in that it was designed improperly or made with ingredients that 
were too harmful, and that the imperfections were scientifically dis-
coverable. In order to support recovery on a negligence theory, it 
would have to be established that the magnitude of the danger out-
weighed the usefulness of the product and that a reasonable man 
in the position of the maker should have appreciated the imbalance 
when the product was sold.26 There would of course be differing 
opinions as to how much the manufacturer should have discovered 
of that which was scientifically cognizable.27 If strict liability is ap-
plicable, there is no necessity for showing that, as a reasonable man, 
the maker should have had knowledge of his product's unsafe quali-
ties. It is sufficient if, after accidents have occurred, it appears to 
have been an unreasonably dangerous product. Here again, nothing 
revolutionary has been achieved by imposing strict liability on 
makers. It can be argued that this type of liability will induce a 
26. See Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a 
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962). 
27. For cases involving this problem, see Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 
F.2d 842, 848-49 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Braun v. Roux Dis-
trib. Co., 312 S.W .2d 758 (Mo. 1958); La Plant v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 846 
S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961). See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Problems 
Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965). 
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manufacturer to exercise greater care before he changes the design 
of a mechanical product or makes a new chemical product. Further-
more, it would be reasonable to expect that the consumers of the 
products would be fully capable of bearing such losses in the form 
of higher prices. 
The approach must be different when the unreasonably danger-
ous nature of the product was not scientifically discoverable at the 
time the product was sold. This is not uncommon with drugs and 
other chemical products, for the full extent of the dangers involved 
in the use of some drugs cannot be known until there has been a 
period of use by human beings. Sometimes the side effects are not 
of sufficient seriousness and frequency to warrant withdrawal of 
the drug from the market, but at other times they are. For example, 
MER-29 was made and sold as an anti-cholesterol drug. Considering 
the rate of heart disease, it looked as if it would be a most significant 
product. The drug, however, produced serious side effects, including 
cataracts; and has been withdrawn from the market.28 A substantial 
number of cases are· pending against the maker. In one case the 
court held that the manufacturer was liable for the tragic conse-
quences incurred by a few victims before it was discovered that the 
drug was so dangerous.29 Similarly, in Lartigue v. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co.30 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took the position 
adopted in the Second Restatement of Torts31 that the manufacturer 
of cigarettes did not warrant against undiscoverable risks of contract-
ing lung cancer from the use of cigarettes. These are both situations 
where by hypothesis no amount of care would have disclosed the 
fact that the products were unreasonably dangerous. Since the prod-
ucts were in fact dangerous, the issues here are whether the victims 
of an experimental process are to be compensated and, if so, by 
whom. 
Another problem, distinct from those considered above, is that 
of the allergic user. It is known that nearly all cosmetics and drugs 
will result in substantial harm to a certain percentage of persons. 
Injuries from drugs and cosmetics do occur to hypersensitive and 
allergic persons, even when proper care is exercised in the use of 
the products and there are adequate instructions and warnings con-
28. See Downing, supra note 2. 
29. Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). 
30. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). 
31. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comments j &: k (1965). According to 
comment j, there is no duty to warn of danger unless "by the application of reason-
able, developed human skill and foresight" the maker would have discovered the 
danger. 
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cerning their use.82 Assuming that these facts were established about 
a particular drug or cosmetic and that a, plaintiff is shown to have 
suffered an allergic reaction to the product, should the maker be 
required to absorb the losses arising from such a reaction on the 
theory that he can do so as a cost of doing business? The decisions 
are in conflict with respect to the makers of cosmetics.88 As to drugs, 
however, it does not appear that an allergic user has recovered ab-
sent proof of some negligence on the part of the manufacturer, either 
in failing to give proper instructions for the use of the drug or in 
failing to warn adequately about the dangers presented by it.84 
Numerous other situations could arise in which an injured plain-
tiff might allege that a particular product, although properly made, 
was "defective." A few of these instances will be mentioned below 
in order to demonstrate that each situation presents a different risk 
and hence a different problem of risk allocation. First, the product 
may be mishandled by the user-for example,, a negligently driven 
automobile. Second, the product may be misused by being inappro-
priately used for a purpose other than that for which it was made.8 1S 
Third, the product, although used for an appropriate purpose, may 
be overused, as in the case of a prescription drug which produces an 
adverse reaction when excessive dosages are used. Fourth, a proper 
use of the product may involve the user in an accident caused by 
the activity of a third person using a different article, such as might 
occur in a collision between two airplanes. Fifth, the use of the prod-
uct, although proper, may lead to injury to the user through the in-
tervention of an unforeseeable force of nature, as in the case of an 
airplane crashing in a storm. Obviously, any of these situations may 
also arise _in conjunction with a defective product; for example, an 
excessively caustic hair dye may be used by a consumer who negli-
gently fails to follow directions as to its use.86 
32. See Whitmore, Allergies and Other Reactions Due to Drugs and Cosmetics, 19 
SW. L.J. 76 (1965). 
33. Jacquot v. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958) (fingernail 
polish-no liability); Reynolds v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 135 N.J.L. 475, 52 A.2d 666 (Ct. 
Err. & App. 1947) (lipstick-liability); Bennett v. Pilot Prods. Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 
P.2d 525 (1951) (permanent wave lotion-no liability); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 378 
P.2d 298 (Wash. 1963) (hair tint-liability). · 
34. For a case containing a complete charge to the jury on the subject of adequacy 
of warning regarding the dangers involved in the use thereof, sec Cornish & Cornish 
v. Sterling Drug, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1965). 
35. See Gibson v. California Spray Chem. Corp., 29 Wash. 2d 611, 188 P.2d 316 
(1948) (apple crop destroyed by chemical spray). 
36. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir, 1965) (volun• 
tary exposure to known risk would bar recovery but contributory negligence without 
actual knowledge of danger would not); Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 
214 A.2d 18 (1965) (contributory negligence barred recovery by plaintiff who suffered 
lacerated left wrist in opening glass container). 
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IV . .ALLOCATION OF LOSSES FROM UNKNOWN CAUSES--BURDEN 
OF PROOF AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Each of the above situations presents a somewhat different risk 
or hazard, and indeed each can be further refined. However nar--
rowly described, the issue in each case is how best to allocate the 
particular kind of loss among victims, users, retailers, distributors, 
assemblers, manufacturers of component parts, and enterprisers 
other than those involved in the manufacture and distribution of 
the product. There is, however, one other situation that should not 
be overlooked: a loss may occur under circumstances which make 
it impossible to ascertain its "cause" or "causes." The holdings of 
courts with respect to the allocation of the burden of proof and the 
sufficiency of the evidence to meet the burden frequently pose major 
problems in the area of products liability. If a court concludes, as a 
matter of substantive law, that a manufacturer i's not liable for a 
loss resulting from the use of his product except when the loss arises 
from a "defective" condition, and that the burden of proof is on the 
injured claimant to establish the existence of such a defective condi-
tion, it is readily apparent that the po~ition of the court with re-
spect to the nature and quantum of proof required to justify a find-
ing of a "defective condition" as a ·cause of the harm is of utmost 
significance. The imposition on a maker of strict liability, rather 
than liability based on negligence, for harm resulting from "defec-
tive conditions" does not alter the main issue: proof of the existence 
of a defective product.37 Even if negligence is the only basis for re-
covery, proof of the existence of a defective condition at the time 
possession of the product was surrendered by the manufacturer fre-
quently serves as a basis for an inference of negligence and for the 
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, for if the defect in the 
product existed at that time, it is most likely to have been caused by 
the manufacturer, quite possibly as the result of negligence.38 
Issues involving the sufficiency of the evidence which justifies a 
finding of a defective condition in a mechanical product are quite 
different from those presented when the products involved are in-
tended for intimate bodily use, such as food, drugs, and cosmetics.39 
However, without regard to the nature of the product, the fact that 
37. Keeton, supra note 27. 
38. Lewis v. United States Rubber Co., 414 Pa. 626,202 A.2d 20 (1964) (severed wire 
bead in an automobile tire caused blowout); Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380 S.W .2d 
651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (brake cylinder clogged with pieces of inner lining of flex-
ible hose). 
39. The major difference arises from the fact that unintended injury often flows 
from allergic reactions as well as from defects in such products. 
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injury occurs during or shortly following the use of a product does 
not normally justify a finding, either by the trial judge or the jury, 
that the plaintiff's injury resulted from an accident attributable to 
a defect in the product. Thus, the crash of an airplane does not, in 
and of itself, indicate that the airplane was defectively made, and 
when a car swerves off the road and crashes into a brick wall, it is 
more probable that the accident was caused by the driver's negli-
gence than by a defect in the automobile. A chemical burn follow-
ing the use of a hair dye that is by nature highly caustic does not, 
in and of itself, imply that the product was defective, any more than 
it implies misapplication by a beauty parlor operator, or an allergic 
or hypersensitive victim. No doubt there will be developed rules and 
principles which take into consideration the type of product; indeed, 
some have already been developed with regard to the nature and 
quantum of evidence required to justify the allocation of a risk to a 
maker of a product. These principles are based either on the theory 
that the maker should be liable for harm resulting from unknown 
causes or on the theory that the cause was sufficiently established. 
These rules cannot be overlooked as part of the process for the dis-
tribution and allocation of risks. 
The foregoing observations may be illustrated by some examples. 
In Henningsen, the only evidence (at least the only evidence noted 
in the appellate opinion) of a defect in the new automobile that 
swerved off the road and crashed into a wall was the testimony of 
the driver that, without warning, there had been a loud noise from 
underneath the hood and that something appeared to have cracked. 
She testified that the steering wheel then spun in her hands and the 
automobile went out of control.40 Of course, if there had been an 
investigation of the wreckage by an expert who could have identified 
a condition of the steering mechanism that was probably the cause 
of, rather than caused by, the accident, such evidence would gener-
ally be regarded as sufficient, not only to establish a defective condi-
tion, but also to establish that the maker was negligent either in 
creating or in failing to discover the condition. In the absence of 
that kind of evidence, the trial judge, concluding that a prima facie 
case of negligence had not been established, dismissed the negligence 
count but permitted the case to go to the jury on a warranty theory; 
this, action was affirmed on appeal. 
It is submitted that if the manufacturer is liable only when it is 
established that his product was defective, then the same proof is nec-
essary to establish his strict liability for the defect as is necessary to 
40. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 696 (1960). 
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show negligence, since the latter can be inferred from a defective con-
dition. In some cases, of course, it has been held that the testimony 
of a user indicating that an identifiable component of a prod-
uct had malfunctioned was sufficient to establish a defective condi-
tion as well as negligence.41 This is an understandable and reason-
able position, but it should be noted that such evidence is frequently 
unreliable, especially in the absence of an explanation of why such 
a defect was unidentified after the accident. In cases involving a car 
swerving off the road without explanation, some courts have in-
ferred, and no doubt quite correctly, that the driver was negligent.42 
The question is therefore whether, if the accident is one that, with-
out explanation, points to user negligence or error of judgment, the 
user's testimony of (1) his own proper conduct in the use of the prod-
uct and (2) a malfunctioning of the product should justify the allo-
cation of losses resulting from such an accident to the manufacturer. 
Practical problems in the fact-finding process are involved here, and 
principles of both liability and proof, to be theoretically sound, must 
take account of these problems. To question the probative value of 
the user's testimony is not to say that harm from accidents resulting 
from unknown causes should not be allocated to the maker of the 
product. However, if the cost is to be allocated to the manufacturer 
of a particular product, it should be so allocated not on the basis of 
the technical legal rationales which have been developed to justify 
the shift, but rather on the basis of a policy decision which recog-
nizes the superior ability of the maker to bear the loss. Thus, there 
is a substantial difference between the claim of the ordinary con-
sumer who suffers injury during or after his use of a product and 
the claim of one injured as a result of the use of a product in the 
performance of a service by a professional or an entrepreneur such 
as an airline, a beauty parlor operator, or a physician. 
To illustrate the importance of the questions involved in the 
allocation of losses from unknown causes, and to demonstrate that 
the theory for the allocation of risk is often not so important as the 
position of the court regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to es-
tablish the existence of a defective condition, attention is directed 
to an opinion of an intermediate appellate court in California ap-
proving the action of the trial judge, who at the close of the evidence 
dismissed a warranty count brought by the owner of a building 
41. Testimony of brake failure has been regarded as sufficient for inferring the 
probable presence of a defect when possession of a car was surrendered by its maker. 
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964); Comstock v. 
General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959). 
42. Reibert v. Thompson, 302 Ky. 688, 194 S.W.2d 974 (1946); Etheridge v. Ethe-
ridge, 222 N.C. 616, 24 S.E.2d 477 (1943). 
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against the maker of a heat pump for an air conditioning unit. At 
the same time, the appellate court reversed the trial judge's refusal 
to recognize the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff's 
negligence theory.43 A fire had broken out in a so-called plenum-
a wooden box through which the heat pump propelled hot and cold 
air:. Vents in the plenum directed hot and cold air to the rooms in 
the building. The defendants were the contractor who installed the 
air conditioning equipment and the maker of the heat pump. The 
appellate court concluded that, although the trial judge's finding as 
to the insufficiency of the evidence to establish a defective condition 
of the heat pump should not be disturbed, it would not have been 
inconsistent with that finding for the judge to have inferred negli-
gence on the part of either or both defendants pursuant to the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine. It would appear difficult to justify a finding 
of negligence against the maker of the heat pump without also find-
ing a defective condition, and the latter finding would be the only 
requirement for strict liability. This case is mentioned simply to 
demonstrate the importance of rules pertaining to proof of negli-
gence and proof of defective conditions in the allocation of risks. 
As a practical matter, the liability of suppliers of cosmetics, drugs, 
and other products intended for ,intimate bodily use may be ex-
panded more by rules pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence 
to establish a defective condition than by the rejection of the usual 
requirement of negligence or fault as a basis for shifting a loss. When 
injury occurs during the use of a drug or a cosmetic, the harm may 
be explained by factors other than the existence of a defective con-
dition of the product. The victim may have suffered from an allergic 
reaction because of a sensitivity that he normally has to a particular 
substance, or he may have been suffering from a hypersensitivity 
caused by a temporary abnormal condition, such as an illness. An-
other possibility is that the product may have been so inherently 
toxic that an overdosage, an overuse, or a misuse would have ad-
versely affected most people. It follows, therefore, that even when 
the injury occurs in such a way as to demonstrate conclusively that 
the victim's reaction was caused by the product, it is not necessarily 
more likely that the reaction was due to a defective condition than 
that it was due to misuse or hypersensitivity. Thus, in Hanrahan v. 
Walgreen Co.,44 the court held that plaintiff could not recover for a 
chemical burn suffered after the use of a hair rinse because there was 
"no evidence ... that the hair rinse contained any poisonous or dele-
43. Greening v. General Air Conditioning Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Dist. Ct. App, 
1965). 
44. 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955). 
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terious ingredient to a normal person who used it."45 Similarly, in 
Benavides v. Stop b Shop, Inc.,46 plaintiff was denied recovery for 
an injury to her eye following the use of soap. The court, making it 
clear that plaintiff had not established that the product was defective 
by merely showing an injury following use, remarked that no evi-
dence of a chemical analysis of the product had been introduced to 
establish the existence of an irritant which would have made the 
product defective. 
On the other hand, in John A. Brown Co. v. Shelton,47 plaintiff 
recovered for damages resulting from a chemical haircut and burns 
following the application of a product known as "Tint 'N Set." No 
chemical analysis of the particular product was given in evidence, 
but the user testified that the material was "off color" and that the 
hair gummed and matted when it was applied. Likewise, the Mich-
igan Supreme Court recognized that there was sufficient evidence to 
establish that a defective condition of a slip was a cause for plain-
tiff's dermatitis without proof of an identifiable harmful substance in 
the slip.48 In that case, plaintiff claimed that severe dermatitis had 
been caused by an irritant in the slip and that the emotional stress 
that ensued had triggered a heart attack. The majority concluded 
that a legitimate inference could be drawn from plaintiff's-proof that 
an irritant was present in the cloth and, while recognizing that evi-
dence in rebuttal by the defense might well refute the plaintiff's case, 
reversed the trial judge's dismissal of the action. The dissent, how-
ever, indicated that the result was indeed novel unless one was pre-
pared to say that use plus injury equals a prima facie case of liability. 
v. NATURE OF HARM AND TYPE OF PURCHASER 
In developing a system of rules and principles for the allocation 
of the risks of harm involved in the use of products, especially ~s be-
tween purchasers and manufacturers, several courts have suggested 
that distinctions ought to be made among the various types of losses 
which a claimant seeks to shift to someone else. While many of the 
same principles will and should ultimately apply regardless of the 
nature of the loss, there are persuasive reasons for making some dis-
tinctions among different types of harm, at least until the effect of 
the imposition of strict liability can be more satisfactorily evaluated. 
There are at least four feasible categories of harm: (I) physical in-
jury to persons; (2) physical damage to tangible things other than 
45. Id. at 270, 90 S.E.2d at 394. 
46. 190 N.E.2d 874 (Mass. 1963). 
47. 391 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1963). 
48. Bronson v. Hudson Co., 135 N.W. 388 (Mich. 1965). 
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. the product itself; (3) physical harm to the product itself; and (4) 
commercial or economic losses which involve no physical harm and 
which are occasioned by the unfitness of the product, either for 
the specific purpose of the user or for the general purposes .!or which 
the product was made and sold. 
Seely v. White Motor Company40 is a leading case in which the 
distinction between commercial losses and physical harm is explained 
both by the majority and the concurring opinions. The claimant, 
who was engaged in the business of heavy-duty hauling, purchased 
from a retail dealer a truck manufactured by the White Motor Com-
pany. Shortly after he acquired the truck, the plaintiff discovered 
that it bounced violently, an action known as "galloping." For eleven 
months the retail dealer and the manufacturer's representatives 
made unsuccessful attempts to correct the defect, and ultimately the 
truck overturned. Although no one was injured, two claims were 
made: a claim of $5,466 for physical damage to the truck arising out 
of the accident and a claim of about $20,900 for economic and com-
mercial losses, including payments on the truck and lost profits suf-
fered during the period of the truck's defective performance. At the 
time of purchase, the plaintiff had signed a document that included 
the usual manufacturer's warranties and disclaimers. It was found 
at the ·trial that the accident was not caused by the galloping char-
acteristic of the truck, and so the liability of the maker for physical 
damage to the truck was not in issue. 
Chief Justice Traynor, in the majority opinion in Seely, took 
great pains to develop the theses that "the law of sales has been care-
fully articulated to govern the economic relations between suppliers 
and consumers of goods,"60 and that the commercial codes adopted 
in mo~t of the states should therefore be regarded as the source for 
ascertaining the rights and obligations of those in the distributive 
chain. Thus, the law concerned with liability for commercial losses, 
including questions relating to the validity and effect of disclaimer 
clauses and to the liability of makers and distributors to those who 
either are not in the distributive chain at all, such as bystanders, or 
are not in privity of contract in a marketing sense, should be devel-
oped independently of the law involving claims for physical damage 
either to persons or tangible property. The latter claims are to be 
governed in California by the rules and principles of tort responsi-
bility, rather than by warranty or contractual theories. However, 
since virtually all courts recognize that the implied warranty of mer-
chantability or general fitness of the product for its intended pur-
49. 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
50. Id. at 21, 403 P.2d at 149. 
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poses is an obligation imposed by law on the seller and is a species 
of strict liability which does not depend on the seller's expressed in-
tention to be bound, it would appear to be relatively immaterial 
whether the theory for the imposition of liability, either for com-
mercial losses or for physical harm, is regarded as tortious or con-
tractual. This is not to say that the rules and principles set forth in 
the commercial codes primarily for the purpose of shifting commer-
cial losses should be transferred in toto to damages claims for phys-
ical harm. In the Second Restatement of Torts,51 the American Law 
Institute adopted a principle of strict tort liability but limited its 
application to cases involving physical harm, on the assumption that 
the commercial codes should be interpreted so as not to prevent the 
development of rules and principles for allocating physical losses 
among victims, makers, and other sellers of products. Thus, the dis-
tinction made in Seely follows the ideas set forth in the Second Re-
statement. 
Other courts have recognized the significance of this basic distinc-
tion between commercial losses and physical damage. The Oregon 
Supreme Court recently adopted the position of the California Su-
preme Court, justifying its decision by pointing out that courts have 
frequently overlooked fault and privity requirements in cases in-
volving physical injuries to persons because the "hazard to life and 
health is usually a personal disaster of major proportions to the 
individual, both physically and financially, and something of minor 
importance to the manufacturer or wholesaler against which they can 
protect themselves by a distribution of risk through the price of the 
article sold. "52 In this particular case, the court held that a whole-
saler of a tractor would not be liable to an ultimate purchaser for 
commercial losses arising from the tractor's defective construction. 
Historically, in cases based on tort theories of liability, the deter-
mination of (1) the kind of fault, if any, necessary to subject an actor 
to legal liability, (2) the ambit of his responsibility for the remote 
and unintended consequences of his acts, and (3) the class of p~rsons 
to whom he is liable, has been governed by different legal rules and 
concepts depending on whether compensation was sought for physical 
injury or for economic loss. Numerous examples could be given, but 
two should suffice. Negligent conduct that prevents the performance 
of a contract does not normally subject the actor to liability for the 
economic loss to the promisor resulting from his inability to per-
form his contract.53 Likewise, one who innocently, albeit negligently, 
51. Section 402A. 
52. Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965). 
53. Donovan Constr. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1955), 
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induces another by his misrepresentation of fact to make a disad-
vantageous contract is not subject to liability for the economic loss 
suffered by the representee.54 On the other hand, few persons would 
question the proposition that a negligently uttered false statement 
calculated to induce the kind of reliance that was in turn likely to 
cause physical injury should and does subject the representer to lia-
bility. The distinction between an actor's liability £or economic loss 
and his liability for physical harm has been carefully made through-
out the Second Restatement. This distinction arises not only from 
legal history, but also because the problems of recovery for economic 
loss and for physical injury differ in many ways. For example, the 
kinds of questions that are involved in deciding whether a retail 
druggist, as a maker of drugs, should be held liable to the victims 
of MER-2955 are quite different from those which arise when an 
adhesive purchased from a chemical company fails to hold glass win-
dow panes in place, and the contractor is forced to replace several 
thousand panes at great expense.56 
This is not to say that certain critical observations in Justice 
Peters' concurring opinion in Seely51 are not worthy of thoughtful 
consideration in determining the best allocation of risks among vic-
tims, users, and the various links in the manufacturing and distribu-
tion processes. Justice Peters' position was that the majority unduly 
feared that if the same strict liability rules were made applicable to 
economic losses as are applied to physical injuries, "the manufacturer 
would be liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope.""8 
He believed that it was not the nature of the damage but rather the 
nature of the ultimate transaction and the relative roles played by 
'the parties in the distribution and use of the product that were im-
portant. This writer would not exclude those considerations because 
they may often be of greater importance than the nature of the dam-
age. In fact, the following additional considerations are also rele-
8 STAN. L. REv. 725 (1956). The leading case is Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. &: B. 216 (Q.B. 
1853). 
54. Derry v. Peek, [1899] 14 A.C. 337. Some courts have held parties to the contract 
strictly accountable for economic loss resulting from misstatements of fact, but this 
type of responsibility has been limited to parties to the contract and has the same 
economic effect as rescission, since the parties are restored to status quo. Aldrich v. 
Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581 (1908). 
55. See McLeod v. Merrell Co., 114 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965). The court held that a 
retail druggist would not be strictly accountable and there was some indication that, 
as regards an experimental drug such as this, the maker would not be held liable. 
See text accompanying note 28 supra. 
56. Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1965). 
57. Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (con• 
curring opinion). 
58. Id. at 28, 403 P.2d at 156. 
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vant: the nature of the user of the product, the methods employed 
in the article's manufacture and distribution, the types of entities 
involved in the manufacturing and distributing processes, the type 
of activity that the user was engaged in when the harm occurred, the 
class of people to which the victim belongs, and the legal process 
involved in shifting losses. 
It is at least arguable that, in the absence of a miscarriage in the 
manufacturing process, the maker of a drug, especially one de-
signed to save lives, should not be subjected to liability for the 
consequences to those who are harmed by its use, even if the 
drug, after an experimental period, is subsequently withdrawn 
from the market as an unreasonably dangerous product. Such 
an imposition of liability could produce socially undesirable re-
sults by discouraging the development of new drugs, and there 
may be better ways for society to compensate those who are in-
jured during the experimental period. On the other hand, en-
terprisers engaged in distributing non-essential products like cos-
metics may well be expected to bear the risks of any scientifically 
undiscoverable dangers that are ultimately the cause of the product's 
being withdrawn from the market. A ·general principle of liability 
for harm resulting from scientifically undiscoverable risks, applicable 
to all kinds of products and all types of makers and sellers, may be 
unsound, but it does not follow that the only alternative is a general 
principle of non-liability for such risks. 
It may be that most victims are prepared to bear such losses or 
can be educated to be willing to accept them. Moreover, if this is not 
the case, then, as Judge Burke pointed out in Goldberg v. Kollsman 
Instrument Corp.,59 "inherent in the question of strict products or 
enterprise liability is the question of the proper enterprise on which 
to fasten it."60 It may be, for example, that the more appropriate 
group to which losses from airplane accidents should be shifted is 
the patrons of the airlines rather than the makers of the airplanes, 
even when the accident is due to a miscarriage in the manufacturing 
process. This would eliminate the time-consuming and expensive 
task of allocating risks on the basis of a judicial determination of 
whether the accident was due to abnormal weather conditions, a mis-
carriage in the manufacturing process, or a miscarriage in the use of 
the aircraft. Why should an effort be made to determine whether an 
accident was due to a miscarriage in manufacturing or in use if the 
patrons of the airline are ultimately to bear the cost through higher 
prices? It would appear that consideration has been given to only 
59. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (dissenting opinion). 
60. Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85. 
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one of several factors when courts have purportedly extended strict 
liability to the makers of all kinds of products, rather than only 
those intended for intimate bodily use, on the theory that it is just 
as important to protect against externally caused injuries as against 
injuries internally produced. That accidents should be prevented, 
and that victims should have means available to safeguard them-
selves against injury and relieve themselves of the burdens of those 
accidents that do occur are acceptable propositions, but they do not 
answer the question of how best to achieve these desirable objectives. 
Producers of products that are made and designed only for use 
by experts and professionals may justifiably be treated different}y 
from makers of products that are available to the general public. 
Thus, the rules for the allocation of losses resulting from the use 
of inherently dangerous prescription drugs or cosmetics, such as hair 
bleaches, need not necessarily be the same as those applicable to 
drugs and cosmetics obtained over the counter. Since prescription 
drugs are by their very nature inherently dangerous and are known 
by all concerned to be so, even though the extent of the danger may 
be unknown or undiscoverable, and since they are not often utilized 
except when a patient's life or health is already endangered by some 
other cause, it is quite possible that it would be highly desirable to 
distinguish, as at least one court has done, 61 between dealers in pre-
scription and in non-prescription drugs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
No consideration of how the law should allocate risks of harm 
occurring during the use of products is complete without a discus-
sion of the validity of contractual arrangements for the allocation 
of such losses. However, no attempt has been made here to deal with 
this important problem. Moreover, except as the question has been 
mentioned incidentally, nothing has been said herein about when, 
if ever, liability without fault should be imposed on the maker of 
products in favor of those who were not users but who were in the 
zone of danger of an unreasonably dangerous product. With respect 
to this problem, most courts, especially those following warranty 
theories, have seen fit to disregard privity of contract only in a mar-
keting sense and have limited recovery to those in the distributive 
chain-consumers, users, and those in their immediate households. 
It can safely be said that it will be quite some time before the law 
pertaining to this subject becomes stabilized and predictable. 
61. McLeod v. Merrell Co., 114 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965). The court seems to say that 
the warranty of merchantability should apply only when goods are offered for con• 
sumption to the public generally, and, since MER-29 was not available to the public 
generally, its merchantability was not warranted. 
